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THE SCOPE OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL IMMUNITY
AGAINST SEARCHES AND SEIZURES*,
JOHN

E. F. WOOD**

"Every man's house is called his castle. Why? Because it is surrounded by a moat, or defended by a wall?
No. The poorest man may, in his cottage, bid defiance
to all the forces of the Crown. It may be frail; its roof
may shake; the wind may blow through it; the storm
may enter; the rain may enter; but the King of England
dares not cross the threshold
may not enter; all his force
1
of the ruined tenement."
These picturesque words of Lord Chatham, spoken at a
time when popular indignation against sovereign oppression ran high, expressed rather indefinitely what the mass
of individualistic Englishmen earnestly hoped and believed
to be the law. For years, almost for centuries, they had
heard the familiar maxim quoted approvingly, and had
seen the King's messengers go about their business in open
disregard of it. And now their courts had definitely lined
up on the side of the people in resisting encroachment on
the ancient rights declared by the common law, and their
Parliament, not to be outdone, had echoed the doctrine that
* The James P. Brown Prize Thesis, 1926-27. In 1919 the late James F. Brown,
of the class of 1873, gave $5,000.00 to the University to be invested by it and the income
used as a prize for the best essay each year on the subject of the individual liberties
of the citizen as guaranteed by our constitutions. Any senior or any graduate of any
college of the University, within one year after receiving his bachelor's degree. may
compete for this prize.
** LL.B. West Virginia University, 1927. Huntington, West Virginia.
2 Chatham's address in Parliament, 1766, quoted in CooLFY, CONSTITUTioNAL LwiTATIONS, p. 425, n. 1.
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so far as searches and seizures were concerned, a man's
house was indeed his castle. Small wonder that the people
rejoiced, and found great comfort in the extravagant statement of Lord Chatham.
Of all his Majesty's subjects, none were more interested
in these momentous events than were the American colonists. On the frontier of the world, these pioneers in individual liberty and security felt perhaps more keenly than
anyone else the evils of governmental interference. They
found themselves too far away from Westminster Hall to
benefit from the unwritten Constitution. The infringement
of what they considered their indefeasible rights rankled.
It was therefore to be expected that when the time should
come when they would have the power to make their own
Constitution they would embody in it positive guarantees
against the oppression they had formerly felt. The Bill of
Rights of the American Constitution is generally considered
to contain a re-enactment of the old maxim that every man's
house is his castle.2 It might be supposed that in this age,
when sovereigns have become more moderate and the peo
ple have found that many items of individual liberty must
be surrendered in the interest of the general welfare, the
emphasis on these old safeguards would be diminished.
That, however, has not been the case. As a corollary of
the idea that the individual must be subjected to the welfare of society, has come the doctrine that a paternal government can and must regulate the life of its citizens to an
extent hitherto unknown. Such regulation necessarily involves, to a certain extent, the surrender of absolute privacy. But the American people cannot so soon forget the
heritage from those who earned the right of privacy at such
expense. Today, instead of admitting that for the better
conservation of the public health, safety and morals, a
man's house is not so completely a castle as it once was, the
people are insisting on the retention of the old doctrine to
its full extent; and they go further. They seek to extend
the sanctity of the home to offices, vehicles, open fields, in
short, to any place where they might wish to hide the
machinery of their crime. So the constitutional protections against unlawful searches and seizures, instead of fall2 Boyd

v. United States, 116 U. S. 616 (1886) ; COOLEY, op. cit., p. 424 ff.
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ing into disuse, have risen to occupy a position of greatest
importance in our administration of justice. The courts
are flooded with litigation involving questions of search
and seizure. One enterprising writer has ascertained from
the American Digest system that since January 16, 1920,
American courts have been forced to decide more than 700
cases involving the question of the admissibility of evidence
obtained by wrongful search. and seizure.3 In all these
cases, the courts must endeavor to strike a balance between
the ancient rights of the people and the necessities of a
social age. The problem thus presented is one of fundamental importance. To approach it properly requires a
careful study of the meaning of our constitutional provisions relating to searches and seizures. And this study
must begin, not with the adoption of the Constitution, but
with the very beginning of the common law on the subject.
The use of search warrants can be traced into English
history to about the beginning of the seventeenth century.
In the early part of that century they were declared illegal
by Lord Coke. 4 Within a short time, however, they came
to be considered as proper devices for one purpose, the
search for stolen goods. 5 Their use grew up apparently
without the aid of statute, simply by "imperceptible practice" of the common law courts.6 The Crown saw in these
new devices a most effective means of ferreting out seditious matter and of bringing the offenders to justice. Hence
arose the practice of issuing warrants whereby the King's
messengers were ordered to search out disloyal writings.
It is difficult to determine at what period this use of warrants arose, but it apparently came shortly after their first
invention for any purpose. In 1634, just six years after he
had written that all search warrants were unlawful, Lord
Coke, then on his death bed, was visited by the Secretary of
State armed with a warrant to search for seditious papers.
Every room in the house, save that in which the former
Chief Justice lay, was ransacked and papers of. every description seized. Among those taken were the original
manuscripts from which had been printed the Commentary
36 YALE L. J. 536.
'

4 INST. 176.
HALE, P. C., vol. I,

p. 150.
Entick v. Carrington, 2 Wils. K. B. 274, 19 How. St. .Tr. 1030, 95 Eng. Rep. 807
(1765).
'
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on Littleton and his second, third and fourth Institutes, his
will, and many other valuable documents. The will was
wholly lost, and the legal manuscripts were only returned
by order of the Long Parliament.7 Such outrageous practices apparently were continued without opposition, and,
indeed, within a few years received legislative recognition.
Shortly after the restoration of Charles II, an act was passed
to regulate the publication of books in the hope of stamping out all utterances of a disloyal nature. This Act authorized the issuance of warrants under the sign manual or by
the Secretaries of State directing the messengers to search
in any place where they knew or had reason to suspect that
books were being printed to ascertain if the books were
properly licensed and contained lawful matter." This statute expired in 1694, but the issuance of similar warrants
was continued. It will be noted that the chief difference
between the search warrants which the common law writers
recognized to be lawful and these writs for the suppression
of sedition were that the former were used solely to discover stolen goods, the latter for the seizure of any sorts
of documents which the messengers saw fit to pounce upon,
and that in the one there was definite direction as to places
of search, while the other was an unrestrained "roving
commission." 9
The use of these general warrants proved very burdensome to the people, and there were sporadic outbursts of
popular indignation against them. One of the grounds
urged for the impeachment of Chief Justice Scroggs in 1680
was that he had in an arbitrary manner "granted divers
general warrants for attaching the persons and seizing the
goods of his Majesty's subjects, not named or described
particularly in said warrants." 10 The opposition to these
warrants, however, lacked the spirit and determination to
require from the courts a definite pronouncement as to
their legality. For over a century the people awaited one
with enough temerity to attack the system in an open and
direct manner. Such an antagonist finally appeared in the
person of John Wilkes, "a profane and profligate man of
CAMPBELL, LIVES OF THE CHIEF JUSTICES, vol. I p. 246.
13 & 14 Car. II, c. 83 (1662).
'MAY, CONsT'L HISTORY OF ENGLAND, voL II, p. 246.
10 7 How. St. Tr. 487.
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fashion who, because of his wit, his audacity, and his skill
in meeting the ill-advised attempts of the government to
suppress him, became the darling of the populace.""
Wilkes, a member of Parliament, was the publisher of a
pamphlet known as "The North Briton Review," a journal
devoted to attacking the government. In 1763 the famous
"No. 45" was published, a remarkably inoffensive sheet
measured by present day standards, but one which aroused
the ire of the ministry. Lord Halifax, principal Secretary
of State, determined to stamp out this seditious publication.
He issued a warrant to four of the King's messengers, the
principal clause of which was as follows:
"These are in his Majesty's name to authorize and
require you, taking a constable to your assistance, to
make strict and diligent search for the authors, printers,
and publishers of a seditious and treasonable paper, intitled, THE NORTH BRITON, NUMBER XLV, APRIL
23, 1763, printed for G. Kearsley in Ludgate Street, London, and them, or any of them, having found, to apprehend and seize, together with their papers, and to bring
in safe custody before me to be examined concerning the
premises, and further dealt with according to law * * ,,12
With this warrant for their guidance, the officers set out on
their mission. Not knowing whom to arrest or where to
search, they were forced to resort to the testimony of men
in the street, following the vaguest hints and most uncertain
guesses. And a most thorough job they did. Within three
days they had arrested no less than forty-nine persons on
suspicion. 13 From some source they learned of Wilkes'
connection with the publication, and he was forthwith arrested and imprisoned in the Tower. The messengers then
returned to his home and ransacked it. Rifling every chest
and drawer, they filled great sacks with papers and carried
them away to be scrutinized by the offended ministers.14
The news of this raid produced a populaT excitement
amounting almost to hysteria. When Wilkes' attorneys applied for a writ of habeas corpus, the room was crowded to
such a degree as the reporter "never before saw it," and
when the writ was granted on the ground of parliamentary
11 CROSS, SHORTER HISTORY OF ENGLAND,

32 Rex v. Wilkes,

P. 510.

21fra,
n. 15.

23 MAY, op. cit.. vol. II, p.

246.

11 Wilkes v. Wood, Lofft. 1, 19 How. St. Tr. 1154, 98 Eng. Rep. 489 (1163).
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privilege, "there was a loud huzza in Westminster Hall."'1
Proceedings were instituted in Parliament for the expulsion
of Wilkes, and the debate arose to such heat as to lead to
a duel between Wilkes and another member, in which the
former almost lost his life.' It was ordered that "The North
.lriton, No. 45" be publicly burned by the hangman, but at
the appointed time there arose the greatest mob that Sheriff
17
Blunt had known for forty years to frustrate the ceremony.

Sometime later, after Wilkes had been reincarcerated, a
similar mob stormed the Tower and bore him on their

shoulders into the hall where Parliament was sitting. 18 May
estimates that the prosecutions arising from these disorders
cost the government a hundred thousand pounds in court
costs.'8 a There was in addition a flood of private litigation,
for the most part actions for damages brought by persons
wronged by the messengers in the execution of their warrant. Fully fifteen verdicts were recovered against them,
calling for exemplary damages. 9 Wilkes recovered four

thousand pounds from Lord Halifax himself. 20
The most important of these cases, however, were
23
22
Wilkes v. Wood,2 ' Money v. Leach, and Huckle v. Money.
In each of them, the judges inveighed strongly against the
use of such general warrants. It has been said that the
cases cannot be taken as holding them illegal because they
went off on procedural points, 24 but the language of the
25
judges was so strong as to leave no doubt of their opinion.
In Huckie v. Money, the illegality was placed on the ground of

n2Rex v.

Wilkes, 2 Wils. K. B. 151, 19 How. St. Tr. 982, 95 Eng. Rep. 737 (1768).
Nov. 17, 1763, reprinted In

26 Letter, Horace Walpole to Sir Horace Mann,
CHEYNEY, READINGS IN ENGLISH HISTORY. p. 619.

11Letter, Horace Walpole to the Earl of Hertford, Dec. 9, 1873,

reprinted In

CHEYNEY, op. cit., p. 620.

I$ Letter, Horace Walpole to Sir Horace Mann, May 12, 1768, reprinted In CHEYNnY,
op. cit., p. 621.
8A

MAY, CONST'L HISTORY or' ENGLAND,

vol.

II, p. 247.

io Opinion of Bathurst, J., Huckle v. Money, 2 Wils. K. B. 205, 95 Eng. Rep. 769
(1763)10 Wilkes v. Earl of Halifax, 2 Wils. K. B. 256, 95 Eng. Rep. 797 (1765).
2 Lofft. 1, 19 How. St. Tr. 1154, 98 Eng. Rep. 489 (1763).
3 Burr. 1741, 19 How. St. Tr. 1002, 97 Eng. Rep. 1075 (1765).
" 2 Wils. K. B. 205. 95 Eng. Rep. 769 (1763).
"4 Hargrave's Note, 19 How. St. Tr. 1027.
..
In Wilkes . Wood, supra, n. 14, Pratt, L. C. J. said, "The defendant claimed a
right under precedents to force persons' houses, break open escritoires, and seize thair
papers upon a general warrant, where no inventory is made of the things thus taken
away, and where no offenders' names are specified in the warrant, and therefore a discretionary power given to messengers to search wherever their suspicions may chance to
fall. If such a power is truly invested in a secretary of state, and he can delegate
this power, it certainly may affect the person and property of every man In this kingdom,
and is totally subversive of the liberty of the subject."
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26
violation of the thirty-ninth section of Magna Charta.
Halifax, however, was slow to learn, and he soon furnished the court another opportunity to consider general
warrants. The offending publication this time was "The
Monitor, or British Freeholder." The warrant differed
from that used against Wilkes in that it named the person
whose effects were to be seized, but it put no restrictions
upon the officers as to the scope of their search. As a consequence, it was about as thorough-going as was the search
of Wilkes' residence. John Entick, the victim of their
zeal, brought an action for damages against the messengers
who conducted the raid. The jury found a special verdict,
stating the facts of the raid, and setting up that such warrants had been in common use since the revolution.27 Lord
Camden's judgment on this verdict definitely disposed of
the question of their legality. Holding that no amount of
usage could sanction such oppressive practice, he concluded,

"We can safely say that there is no law in this country
to justify the defendants in what they have done; if
there was it would destroy all the comforts of society;
for papers
are often the dearest property a man can
28
have."

The judgment in Entick v. Carrington, "considered one of the
landmarks of English liberty '

2

a was soon followed by a

resolution of the House of Commons that general warrants
were universally illegal, except in cases provided for by

act of Parliament.-

Thus the curtain fell upon one of the

most dramatic episodes in English history.

On the European continent meanwhile a somewhat similar scene was being played. For better securing the safety
of the monarchy, the King of France issued lettres de cachet,
containing an expression of the royal will. There was no

limitation on what could be done by means of these lettres.
"' That passage from Magna Charta reads. "No freeman shall be taken or imprisoned
or dispossessed, or outlawed or banished or in any way destroyed, nor will we go upon
him, nor send upon him, except by the legal judgment of his peers or by the law of the

land."
,'Philip Carteret Webb, solicitor to the Treasury under Lord Halifax, later demonstrated the antiquiry of such general warrants by publishing a collection of them
issued on various occasions in nearly every reign for the preceding century. CANDIN
FREEHOLDER, DIALOGUE II, p. 242.
"Entick v. Carrington, supra, n. 6.
Bradley. J., in Boyd v. U. S.,supra, n. 2.
JJouRN. Cow., April 22, 1766; Hargrave's Note, 19 How. St. Tr. 1074.

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1927

7

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 34, Iss. 1 [1927], Art. 2
WE8T VIRGINIA LAW QUARTERLY

They could take the form of orders of arrest, banishment,
or search and seizure warrants. These instruments of
French tyranny ran much the same course as their English
counter-part. The storm of protest against them was at its
highest in 1788 when the Parlement of Paris remonstrated
vigorously against them, although they were not finally exterminated until 1814.80
The third scene in the pre-Constitutional history of search
and seizure is laid in the American colonies thbmse-lves.
The same session of Parliament which enacted the Licensing
Act, under which general warrants for the hounding of sedition were authorized, had passed equally drastic measures
for the enforcement of the revenue laws. The chief weapon
of enforcement was the Writ of Assistance. This was a
blanket permit, issuable to anyone, authorizing him to
prowl about at random and search any suspected place for
goods on which duties had not been paid. The only limitation was that the search must be in the .daytime. 31 Proceedings under this statute appear not to have aroused
much opposition in England; but in the Colonies, where
taxation was none too popular irrespective of methods of
collection, the writs of assistance became particularly obnoxious. Determined opposition first arose in Massachusetts
in 1761. In that year the legality of such writs was questioned in Paxton's Case.3 2 James Otis was at that time
Advocate-general to the Crown, and it became his duty to
represent the government in attempting to sustain their
validity. Instead he resigned his office, saying that in such
case he despised a fee, and took the other side of the case.
In a masterful address he denounced the writs of assistance
as "the worst instrument of arbitrary power, the most destructive of English liberty and the fundamental principles
of law that ever was found in an English law-book." The
judges, almost convinced, sent to England for advice; but
later, in obedience to orders from the ministry, recognized
the writs.33 Although the case was lost, the cause was not
" HONORE MIRABEAU,

"LES LETTES DE CACHET ET DES PRISONS

D'ETAT

(Hamburg,

1782) ; ANDRE CHASSAIGNE, LES LETRrS DE CACHET SOUS L'ANCIEN REGIME" (Paris,

1903).
8,13 & 14 Car. II,c.11, §5 "(1662).
82 Quincy (Mass.) 51 (1761).
33 In an appendix to Quincy's Reports, Mr. Justice Gray reviews at some length the
history of writs of assistance.
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lost. The effect on the people has been thus expressed by
John Adams,
"Every man of an immense crowded audience appeared to me to go away as I did, ready to take arms
against writs of assistance. Then and there was the first
scene of the first act of opposition to the arbitrary claims
Then and there the child Independof Great Britain.
'3 4
ence was born.
The opposition thus kindled spread rapidly. Nearly all
the colonies in their Bills of Rights inserted clauses declaring
these general search permits unlawful. 5 In 1773 the committee of 21 chosen to state the grievances of the colonists
complained that their homes were open to unlimited inspection at the hands of "wretches whom no prudent man would
venture to employ even as menial servants, whenever they
are pleased to say they suspect there are in the house wares
for which the duties have not been paid."3 6 The Continental Congress, in its Memorial of the Inhabitants of the
British Colonies, remonstrated against. the practice of unbridled search and seizure.3 7 The effectiveness of these,
various assertions of right is well known, as well as the
great struggle into which the colonists threw themselves
when peaceable measures proved futile.
Freedom won, the American people set about the task of
raising a government for themselves. The memory of past
oppressions was yet keen, and this was to be a government
so hedged about with restrictions as to make impossible'the
repetition of the abuses to which they had been subject.
One of the chief objections to the Constitution in the form
in which it was presented to the States was that it contained
no Bill of Rights. In the Virginia Convention of 1788, Patrick Henry warned the people that without such safeguards
"excise men may come in multitudes. * * * * go into your
cellars and rooms, and ransack, and measure, everything
you eat, drink and wear." 38 To allay these fears, the First
Congress proposed for ratification a Bill of Rights, asserting
certain fundamental rights of the people which the newly
s'Letter. John Adams to William Tudor, Mar. 29, 1817, reprinted in OLD SOUTH
LrArLETS, vol. VIII, p. 60. See however, MARSHALL, LIFE OF WASHINGTON, voL I, p. 360,
where the learned author minimizes the estrangement with Great Britain produced by

these events.
" Quincy, 495, 509, 535; ELLIOT, DEBATES, vol. IV, p. 244.

23 Quincy, 467.

SJOURNAL OF CONGRESS, vol I, p. 36.
33 BEvERIDGE, LIFE OF ]TARSHALL, vol I, p. 440.
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formed government should never be able to infringe. It
cannot be doubted that the States had in mind writs of
assistance, lettres de cachet, and general warrants, 0 when
they ratified the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution,
providing that,
"The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized."
Not content with this check on the powers of the federal
government, each of the States has enacted into its fundamental law a similar provision. 40 Seventeen of the States,
including West Virginia, copied the Fourth Amendment
verbatim, and in the others the provisions are so substantially similar as to parallel the federal law. There can be
no doubt that all these enactments were intended, each in
its appropriate sphere, to achieve the same result. There
is therefore little justification for varying interpretations
in the different jurisdictions, except as peculiar local conditions may affect the application of the laws. 41 Slight variances in phraseology should not be allowed to becloud the
obvious purpose of these provisions. The observations
made herein in terms of the Fourth Amendment ought
therefore to be applicable to any of the similar state consti"Boyd v. United States, suprc, n. 2.
,0 Alabama: I. 9 (1819), I. 5 (1909) ; Arizona: 8 (1911) ; Arkanusas: II, 9 (1836),
II, 15 (1874) ; California: I, 19 "(1849) ; I, 19 (1879) ; Colorado: 11. 7 (1876) ; Connecticut: I, 8 (1818); Delaware: I. 6 (1792). I. 6 (1897) ; Florida: 1. 7 (1838). Decl. of
Rights, 22 (1885) ; Georgia: I, 18 (1865). 1. I, XVI (1877) : Idaho: 1. 17 (189)
,linois:VIII. 7 (1818), II. 6 (1870) ; Indiana: I. 8 (1816). . 2 (1851); Iowa: I. 8
(1364). I. 8 (1857) ; Kansas: I, 14 (1855). Bill of Rights, 15 (1859) ; Kentucky: XII.
9 (1792). Bill of Rights. 10 (1890) ; Louisiana: VII, 108 (1864), Bill df Rights. 7
(1398) ; Maine: I, 5 (1819) ; Maryland: Decl. of Rights, XXIII (1776), Dccl. of Rights,
26 (1867) ; Massachusetts: I. XIV (1780) ; Michigan: I. 8 (1836), VI, 26 (1860);
Minnesota: I. 10 (1867) ; Mississippi: 1, 9 (1817), 3, 28 (1890) ; Missouri: XIII. 18
(1320). II. ii (1875) ; Montana: II, 7 (1889) ; Nebraska: I, ii (1886-87), 1, 7 (1876) ;
Nevada: I. 18 (1864) : New Hampshire: I. XIX (1784). Bill of Rights, 19 (1002) ; Now
Jersey: I. 6 (1844) ; New Mexico: II. 10 (1910) ; New York: Civil Rights Law. 8 (1828),
Rev. Stat.. pt. 1. c. 3, §11; North Carolina: Dccl. of Rights, XI (1776), I. 15 (1876) ;
North Dakota: I, 18 (1889); Ohio: VIII, 5 (1802), I. 14 (1861) ; Oklahoma: I1, 80
(1907) ; Oregon: 1. 9 (1857); Pennsylvania: Decl. of Rights, X (1776). I. 8 (1878);
Rhode Island: I. 6 (1842) ; South Carolina: I, 22 (1868), I, 16 (1895) ; South Dakota:
VI, ii (1899) ; Tennessee: XI, 7 (1196), I, 7 (1870) ; Texas: 1, 7 (1845) :I, 7 (1867) :
Utah: I. 14 (1895) ; Vermont: .I, XI (1777), L, ii (1798) ; Virginia: Bill of Rights,
10 (1176). 1. 10 (1902) ; Washington: 1, 7 (1889); West Virginia: II 8 (1861-83);
1I1, 6 (1872) ; Wisconsin: I, ii (1848) ; Wyoming: 1, 4 (1889). These citations are
tal:en from an article in 84 HARY. L. REy. 861. The first reference in each instancqis
to the earliest Constitution in which a like provision appears. It should be noted that
the New York provision is not in the Constitution, but in the Civil Rights Law.
• State v. Andrews. 91 W. Va. 720, 114 S. E. 267 (1922).
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tutional immunities, except in rare instances.
In one important respect, however, a distinction must be
made between the federal and state provisions on the subject. The Bill of Rights in the United States Constitution
of course directs its prohibitions only at the federal government. 42 Various attempts have been made to extend
the protection of the federal Constitution to cover violations of the similar state amendments. It has been contended, for instance, that the right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures is one of the privileges and
immunities of citizens of the United States, and therefore
cannot be abridged by the States. This contention failed
because it could not be shown that the right accrued to the
individual as an incident of United States citizenship. 43 A
more plausible position was that the Fourteenth Amendment re-enacted the Bill of Rights against the States, and
that a violation of these rights constituted a denial of due
process. That argument did not prevail, however. 44 The
result is that the federal and state laws on the subject have
not run together.
This delimitation of the sphere of application of the
various constitutional provisions is important because they
are all directed at governmental action. For private trespasses the law afforded adequate redress; for governmental
intrusion it did not. The people were therefore more
afraid of the government than they were of themselves.
For this reason, a search and seizure, however unreasonable, by a private person has no bearing on the constitutions.4
In our system of dual sovereignty, an officer of the
one is a private person as to the other. A search and
seizure by a state officer therefore does not violate the
Fourth Amendment, and a search and seizure by federal
officials does not violate the State Constitution.46 This official relationship to the sovereignty whose constitution is
" Smith v. Maryland, 18 Howard 71 (1855) ; Lloyd v. Dollison, 194 U. S. 445 (1904)
Safe Deposit Co. v. Illinois, 232 U. S. 58 (1913).
- Minor v. Happersett, 21 Wallace 171 (1875) ; Twining v. N. J., 211 U. S. 78
(1908) ; United States v. Crosby, Fed. Cas. No. 14,893 (1871).
" People v. Defore, 242 N. Y. 13, 150 N. E. 585 (1926), certiorari denied by the
United States Supreme Court, 46 Sup. Ct. 353 (1926).
45Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U. S. 465 (1921) ; Kendall v. Commonwealth, 202 Ky.
169, 269 S. W. 71 (1924) ; Hughes v. State, 145 Tenn. 544, 238 S. W. 588, 20 A. L. R.
639 (1922).
- United States v. O'Dowd, 273 Fed. 600 (D. C. Ohio, 1921) ; Robinson V. United
States, 292 Fed. 683 (C. C. A. 9th, 1923) ; Walters v. Commonwealth, 199 Ky. 182, 250
S. W. 839 (1924) ; State v. Rebasti, 306 Mo. 336, 267 S. W. 858 (1924).

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1927

11

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 34, Iss. 1 [1927], Art. 2
WEST VIRGINIA LAW QUARTERLY

invoked may exist de facto. So where state officers are
acting with a tacit understanding that federal officers are
to receive the fruits of the search, the transaction bears the
47
necessary official relationship to the federal government.
The mere presence of federal officers at the scene of a
cearch by state agencies does not make it a federal search ;48
but if the federal men are present in their official capacity,
it is sufficient to link them with it. 40 It has also been suggested that if the federal government seeks to benefit from
the results of a search by state officers, it ratifies or adopts
their methods."0 There cannot be a technical ratification
of course unless the officials purported to act for the federal
government,51 but the doctrine that one sovereignty cannot
a-ppropriate the results of a search and seizure and at the
same time disclaim its methods is commendable and ought
not to be limited by strict rules of agency.
Because these constitutional provisions are directed
solely at governments, they cannot be invoked in protest
against intrusions at the suit of private individuals. Even
though the actual invasion of privacy is made by governmental officials, they are regarded as acting, not for the
government, but for the person complainant. 2 On principle, it seems that when the search and seizure is made for
the benefit of the government the provisions in its Constitution ought to apply whether the particular action is civil or
criminal. For 'historical reasons, however, it has been
held that they have application only in criminal proceedings.5 3 It is of course not necessary that the criminal case
be actually pending; it is sufficient if the search and seizure is in aid of a prosecution, either as a means of preparation for its institution, or as a step in its later progress. 4
Nor is it necessary that the proceeding be technically criminal in its nature. A suit of the government which Will
expose the defendant to a penalty or forfeiture is at least
quasi-criminal and its prosecution must be within the con47

United States v. Falloco, 277 Fed. 275

(D. C. Mo.).

See however United States v.

One Ford Coupe, 3 F'. (2d) 64 (D. C. La. 1924).
" Crawford v. United States, 5 F. (2d) 672 (C. C. A. 6th, 1925).
49 Byars v. United States, U. S. Adv. Ops, Jan. 17, 1927.
Essgee Co. v. United States, 262 U. S. 151 (1923) ; United States v. Welsh, 247
Fed. 239 (D. C. N. Y., 1917).
5'MECHEM, AGENCY, vol. I, §386.
62 Murray v. Hoboken Land Co.,
18 Howard 274

(1855).

6 People v. Kempner. 208 N. Y. 16, 101 N. E. 794 (1913).
54 People v. Kempner, supra, n. 53.
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stitutional prohibitions against unreasonable searches and
seizures.r
This principle has not been extended to proceedings looking to the deportation of aliens. 5
The protection of the Fourth Amendment and the similar
state enactments does not depend upon citizenship. It extends to all residents alike, alien or citizen.57 It also may
be invoked by a corporate person. In Hale v. Henkel, Mr.
Justice Harlan, in a dissenting opinion argued that a corporation ought not to be accorded the immunity from unreasonable search and seizure because the government
would thereby lose an effective means of enforcing its
laws. The majority of the court very clearly held, however, that a corporation was one of "the people" of the
Fourth Amendment.5 8
In ascertaining just what it is that the Fourth Amendment prohibits, the first inquiry necessarily is as to the
meaning of the phrase "searches and seizures." The words
are simple enough, but they have often been mis-applied.
A thorough understanding of their import will save the
Amendment from much over-work.
Webster defines
s'earch as a "careful scrutiny or examination; investigation,"
and seizure as "sudden and forcible grasp or clutch; a taking
into possession." The framers of the Constitution were
not, however, dealing in dictionary definitions; they had in

mind concepts formed largely by recent events in English,
French, and Colonial history. To them a search and seizure was what had happened to Wilkes and Entick; it was
the sort of indignity which had been perpetrated in the
colonies by over-zealous customs officers. What then was
the essence of those offenses? Was it that the victims had
been laid open to incrimination? An examination of the
great English cases arising out of those raids shows that although this was the result, it was not considered as the gist
r Boyd v. United States, supra, n. 2; Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States. 251
U. S. 385 (1920).
Fong v. United States, 149 U. S. 698 (1893).
' United States v. Wong, 94 Fed. 832 (D. C. Vt. 1899); Ex parte Jackson, 263
Fed. 110 (D. C. Mont. 1920) ; Colyer v. Skeffington, 265 Fed. 17 (D. C. Mass. 1920).
cs Hale v. Henkel, 201 U. S. 43 (1906); Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States.
supra, n. 55. The Act of Congress defining the powers of the Federal Trade Commission,
38 STAT. AT LARGE 719, apparently undertakes to make a distinction in this connection
between natural persons and corporations. To secure information from persons, it must
.employ a subpoena duces tecum, but it may, without process, demand for its agents
access to the files of any corporation. It has been suggested that such a distinction is
probably unconstitutional. 8 Calif. L. R. 241. The question was raised but Pot decided
in United States v. Basic Products Co., 260 Fed. 472 (D. C. Pa. 1919).
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of the wrong done. In 1783 it was well settled in England
that an accused could not be compelled to incriminate himself,5 9 and yet the learned counsel for Wilkes did not object
0
to the prosecution arising from the raid on that ground,1
nor was that consideration urged in the actions for damages
against the messengers."' The offenses consisted in something other than its tendency to incriminate the victim. Was
it then that valuable property had been taken? In the
trial of the cases against the messengers, no effort was made
to prove the value of the property taken. The damages assessed were not for property lost, but for security violated.
True, Lord Camden did refer to papers as often being
"man's dearest possessions," but later in the same opinion
he stated as his conception of the true gravamen of the
offense:
"It is not so much the breaking of his door nor the rummaging of his drawers that constitutes the essence of the
offense, but it is the
0' 2 invasion of his indefeasible rights of
personal liberty.
The court apparently was of opinion that every man was
in his home entitled to be free from the prying of officers,
and that this right of privacy should not be violated. The
wrong was done, not when valuable property was taken
away or when incriminating evidence was turned up, but
when the sanctity of the home was invaded in an unreasonable intrusion upon its privacy. An act which commits this
wrong is a search and seizure; and nothing else can properly
be so considered.
In Boyd v. United States,03 the first great American case
construing the Fourth Amendment, the court was called
upon to determine whether or not a compulsory production
of books and papers at the suit of the government constituted an unreasonable search and seizure. Mr. Justice
Bradley, speaking for the Court, conceded that the aggravating incidents of a search and seizure were wanting when

11

Regina '. Mead, 2 Ld. Raym. 927, 92 Eng. Rep. 119 (1704) ; Rex. v. Cornelius, 2
Strange 1210, 93 Eng. Rep. 1133 (1743); Rex v. Purnell, 1 Wils. K. B. 239, 96 Eng.
Rep. 595 (1748).
coRex v. Wilkes, supra, n. 15.
*1 Wilkes v. Wood, supra, n. 14; Huckle v. Money, 2 Wils. K. B. 205, 95 Eng. Rep.
709 (1763) ; Money v. Leach, 3 Burr. 1741, 19 How. St. Tr. 1002, 97 Eng. Rep. 1076
(1765).
Entick v. Carrington, supra, n. 6.
116 U. S. 616 (1886).
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production was compelled upon a subpoena duces tecum.
He pointed out, however, that often the chief purpose of a
search and seizure is to secure incriminating evidence, and
that the production by order of court obtained the same
result. His conclusion was stated thus:
"It is our opinion therefore that a compulsory production of a man's private papers to establish a criminal
charge against him, or to forfeit his property, is within
the scope of the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution,
in all cases in which a search and seizure would be; because it is a material ingredient, and effects the sole object and purpose of search and seizure."
This decision was based largely upon the proposition that
the Fourth Amendment and that part of the Fifth which
provides that none shall be compelled to be a witness against
himself in a criminal proceeding ran together. The Court
said in substance that anything which violated that part of
the Fifth Amendment also violated the Fourth. Such confusion in purpose should not be attributed to the makers of
the Constitution merely because the same official misconduct
may constitute a violation of both prohibitions. Dean Wigmore in his work on Evidence has traced the history of the
privilege against self-incrimination from the early days of
the ecclesiastical courts, and has demonstrated that the his14
torical bases of the two Amendments are quite distinct.
If, as has been asserted above, the Fourth Amendment was
aimed, not at incriminating results, but at objectionable
methods, it seems that the subject matter of the two
Amendments is also quite distinct. In view of these distinctions, the later cases have recognized that the two Amendments have separate missions to fulfill and have treated
them apart from each other6 5
The real basis for the decision in the Boyd Case having
been abandoned, it might be expected that it would no
longer be followed in so far as it held that a compulsory production of books and papers violated the Fourth Amendment. For a time the Court apparently did break away

C WIGITORE, EVIDENCE, VOL. IV,
§2250 et seq., and §2184. Also 5 HARV. L. REV. '71.
7 Adams v. New York, 192 U. S. 585 (1904) ; Interstate Commerce Com'n v. Baird,
194 U. S. 25 (1904). Hale v. Henhel, supra, n. 58. See however Agnell
v. United
States, 269 U. S. 20 (1925).

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1927

15

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 34, Iss. 1 [1927], Art. 2
WEST FIRGINIA LAW QUARTERLY

from that doctrine. 66 The reasoning of Mr. Justice McKenna
in the leading case of this class 7 shows clearly his conception of the true definition of "search and seizure":
"It is said, 'a search implies a quest by an officer of the
law; a seizure contemplates a forcible dispossession of
the owner'. Nothing can be more direct and plain;
nothing more expressive to distinguish a subpoena from
a search warrant * * * . The quest of an officer acts
upon the things themselves-may be secret, intrusive,
accompanied by force. The service of a subpoena is
but the delivery of a paper to a party-is open and aboveboard . There is no element of trespass or force in it."
Such wholesome doctrine as that deserved to live; but it has
been somewhat weakened by subsequent cases. In Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States,68 the government sought
production of certain papers by means of a subpoena. The
knowledge on which the subpoena was based had been obtained by an unlawful search. The Court held that such
production could not be required. Its decision went not so
much on the ground that the production constituted a search
and seizure as that the government was seeking to make indirect use of information which it could not have used
directly. The Court apparently treats that case, however,
as reverting to the doctrine of the Boyd Case to a certain
extent. The present rule is thus summed up in a later case:
"A corporation can only be compelled to produce
its records against itself by the demand of the government
expressed in lawful process, confining its requirements
within limits which reason imposes in the circumstances
of the case. In the case before us the demand was suitably made by duly constituted authority. In the Silv6rthorne Case, it was not."
The willingness of the Court to take this backward step in
cases where corporations are involved may be explained by
the fact that a corporation is not entitled to the immunities
granted by the Fifth Amendment, whereas it is entitled to
those of the Fourth. 69
" Hale v. Henkel, supra, n. 58; American Tobacco Co. v. Werkmeister, 207 U. S.
284 (1907) ; Rendering Co. v. Vermont, 207 U. S. 541 (1907) ; Wilson v. United States,
221 U. S. 361 (1910) ; Am. Lithographing Co. V. Werkmeister, 221 U. S. 603 (1911)
Ex i ,te Fuller, 262 U. S. 91 (1922) ; Dier v. Banton. 262 U. S. 147 (1922).
" Hale v. Henkel, supira, n. 58.
261 U. S. 385 (1920).
Essgee Co. v. U. S., supra, n. 50.
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Another field into which the protection of the Fourth
Amendment has been sought to be extended is that of
examinations and inspections under the police power. Thus
it has been argued that it constituted an unlawful search
and seizure to require pawnbrokers to keep books for inspection by public officers,70 or to require dealers in food to
furnish samples for inspection. 71 The contention failed in
each of those cases, because the courts saw a clear distinction between such regulation and a search and seizure. That
distinction is stated by Freund as follows:
"The power of inspection is distinguished from the
power of search; the latter is exercised to look for property which is concealed, the former to look at property
which is exposed to public view if offered for sale, and
in nearly
all cases accessible without violation of priv2
acy."7
These illustrations of what a search and seizure is may
not aid in an understanding of what it is. There is no
true search and seizure unless there is some actual, present
intrusion upon one's privacy. This intrusion has been said
to exist only in a show of force, actual or constructive."3 In
application of this idea, one court has held that a mere inspection through the windows of an automobile does not
constitute a search.7 4 This is giving a too great emphasis to
the idea of force. The force necessary to a search and
seizure is rather activity than physical violence. The better view therefore is that scrutiny through windows is a
search because it is an active invasion of privacy. 75 It was
at one time thought that an inspection effected through
stealth lacked the element of force.76 The Supreme Court
has definitely decided against that proposition, however. 77
The next problem is, what of these searches and seizures
are prohibited by the constitutional provisions? The common opinion is that the Fourth Amendment was simply a
re-statement of the common law on the subject, not creating
70

Shuman v. Ft. Wayne, 127 Ind. 109. 26 N.

E. 560 (1891).

State v. Dupaquies, 46 La. Ann. 577, 15 So. 502 (1894).
7 FREUND, POLICE POWER, 42. See criticizing this view an article in 18 GREEN
BAo, 273.
13 State v. Turner, 302 Mo. 660, 259 S. W. 427 (1924).
74 State V. Quinn, 111 S. C. 174, 9TS. E. 62 (1918).
15 Mattingly v. Commonwealth. 197 Ky. 583. 247 S. W. 938 (1923).
T' United States v. Maresca, 266 Fed. 713 (D. C. N. Y. 1920).
T Gouled v. United States, 255 U. S. 298 (1920).
"
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any new immunities, but guaranteeing those which already
existed. 8 It is therefore important to know just how the
common law stood at that time. That law may be summed
up briefly thus: There could be no search and seizure without a warrant, 79 except as incidental to a valid arret. 8 0
Search warrants could be issued only for the search for
82
stolen goods,"' or to seek out goods hid from taxation;
but it was recognized that the use of search warrants could
be extended to other fields by legislation. 83 Search warrants
could issue only for the search of places, not of persons. 84
Because the common law thus hedged about the practice
of search and seizure, and because the two clauses of the
Fourth Amendment are placed so close together, almost in
one breath as it were, it has sometimes been contended that
there can be no constitutional search and seizure without a
warrant. Thus an early work on constitutional law said,
"The term 'unreasonable' is used to indicate that the
sanction of a legal warrant is to be obtained before
searches or seizures are made." 85
Such a construction, however, ascribes to the authors a
circumlocution, and makes a part of the Amendment meaningless. Had it been intended that there be no search and
seizure without a warrant, what would have been easier
than to have said so? As has been said by Chief Justice
Marshall,
"The enlightened patriots who framed our Constitution, and the people who adopted it, must be understood to have employed words in their natural sense, and
to have intended what they have said."801
The first clause of the Amendment cannot be given its natural sense if the word "unreasonable" is construed to mean
"without a search warrant." It is interesting to note that
the same Congress which drafted the Bill of Rights also
enacted statutes providing for search and seizure without
'a

COOLEY. CONST'L LIMS., p. 424 et seq.
SIn, re Swan, 150 U. S. 737 (1893) ; Kennedy v. Favor, 14 Gray 200 (1859).

Wo
Weeks v. Unitsd States, 245 U. S. 618 (1918).
HALE, P. C. vol. II, p. 150.
- Baker v. Wise. 16 Gratt. (Va.) 139 (1869).
'

1 ALSBURY, LAWS OF ENGLAND,
H
"

Vol. IX. p. 310,

Collins v. Lean, 68 Cal. 284, 9 Pae. 173 (1885).

8S RAWLE, CONST'L LAW, p. 124.

10 Gibbons v. Ogden. 9 Wheaton 1, 188 (1824).

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol34/iss1/2

18

Wood: The Scope of the Constitutional Immunity against Searches and Sei
THE SCOPE OF THE CONSTITUTIONIL IMMUNITY

warrant.8 7 That is a most convincing fact.
sons, it has become well settled that,

19

For these rea-

"Each (clause) is clear, independent and complete by
itself. The first recognizes search and seizure regardless
of process, but restricted by a comprehensive master adjective compelling in performance exercise of moderation
and good judgment to the exclusion of prejudice, temper
and passion. The second deals with warrants where time
and circumstances permit or in reason require them * *
•

*

"88

In this view of the Amendment, the first clause becomes the
more important, because it states the broad general prohibition; the second is merely a particularization of the
necessary elements of reasonableness in a certain class of
cases. In this view, the word "unreasonable" becomes the
very keystone of the whole law on the subject; it is indeed
the master adjective.
Reasonableness is of course a well-known legal standard. It embraces much more than law, however. It is
primarily a fact conception. Its application involves the
setting up of an objective man, the average of the consciences of the judges, and comparing the facts of the particular case with what that man would have done. In such a
process, each case is unique. For this reason, it is impossible, or at least unwise, to reduce the law to detailed rules.
The flexibility of the Constitution is best preserved without
them. One or two illustrations of the results of rules in the
law of search and seizure will suffice. As will be pointed
out later, the Supreme Court has apparently adopted the
rule that there can be no reasonable search of a private
residence without a warrant. An officer may, however,
enter and even break his way into a residence, without a
warrant, in order to arrest a felon. 89 Thus the legality of
the entrance is made to depend upon the purpose of the officer: if he enters to search, he is acting wrongfully, if he
enters to arrest, he enters rightfully. The situation is further
complicated by the application of another rather definite
rule which has been adopted as to searches and seizures. It
is generally said that a search incidental to arrest is reason-

"

1 STAT. AT LArntr, 29, 43.
People v. Case, 220 lMich. 379, 190 N. W. 289 (1922).
Cases collected in note, 5 A. L. R. 263.
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able without a warrant 9 0 Suppose then that the officer
enters for the purpose of making a search. He is intruding
unlawfully. If he makes an arrest, however, the search
becomes rightful; if he fails to make an arrest, but merely
seizes goods, he has violated the Constitution.
These unfortunate results of defining the standard of
reasonableness have led one court to express itself in no uncertain terms on the rule as to searches incidental to arrest.
Its language may as well be applied to any attempt to reduce reasonableness to a rule.
"To say that a man may be searched after arrest,
though not before, or that a place or house may be
searched when a crime is there seen to be committed, and
not otherwise, is to introduce false standards; the fundamental question always remains: was the search or seizure unreasonable? The arrest is no more than some evidence that suspicion came near enough to certainty to
make both arrest and search reasonable.""1
In one important instance, the Supreme Court has repudiated rules. Because search and seizure is so closely akin to
arrest, it has often been urged that the right to search
without a warrant should be on the same basis as the right
to arrest without a warrant.9 2 Arrests, however, are governed by rather techAical rules, based on careful distinct:ions between felonies and misdemeanors. Nowadays when
that distinction is not so important, continued emphasis
In
upon it is not a means of arriving at "reasonableness."
Carroll v. United States93 the Court definitely decided that the
lawfulness of a search and seizure is not to be measured by
the analogous rules as to arrest.
The most that can be done by way of systematizing the
law of search and seizure is to undertake to formulate
certain principles governing in a general way the exercise
of such a power. The first thing to be determined is the
relation between a search with a warrant and one without
such warrant. As has been shown, the early law knew no
such thing as search and seizure without a warrant. There
00Cases

collected in note, 27 A. L. R. 716.
% Hough, Jr., in a separate opinion concurring in result but dissenting In reasoning in Agnello v. United States, 290 Fed. 671 (C. C. A. 2d, 1923), reversed in Agnello v.
United States, supra, n. 65.
9 Elrod v. Moss. 278 Fed. 123 (C. C. A. 4th, 1921); Hughes v. State, 145 Tenn.
544, 238 S. W. 588 (1922).
03 267 U. S. 132 (1924).
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is no doubt today that there may be a reasonable search
and seizure without a warrant, in certain instances;94 but
it must be recognized that such action without a warrant is
but a substitute for the more orderly method. It may be
premised, therefore, that if a search and seizure would not
be authorized with a warrant, it would be unreasonable
without one. In what cases then may there be a lawful
search and seizure under a search warrant? The answer
depends upon three factors: (1) The purpose of the search,
(2) the nature of the property seized, and (3) the pertinent statutory provisions.
Search and seizure is a drastic measure. It involves an
interference with interests which are considered almost
sacred. Because it is an heroic remedy, its use should be
restricted to cases where there is a high purpose whose importance will outweigh the considerations of private convenience. The vindication of a private right is not considered of sufficient importance to justify the employment of
the weapon of search and seizure.5 It is true that the
earliest instance of a search warrant was at the behest of
a private person for the recovery of his property which had
been stolen. The recapture of stolen goods, however, is of
importance to the public, not so much that the goods may
be restored to the owner as that the public offense may be
brought to light and punished. The early authorities emphasized the fact that the purpose of search warrants was
the prevention of crime and the detection of criminals. 9
This conception of the purpose of search and seizure pre.
vails largely today. It is a means available only to the
state for the better enforcement of its public laws. So it
has been held that a statute which authorized brewers to
employ search warrants to secure the return of bottles retained by their customers was unconstitutional, because it
allowed search and seizure for the vindication of a mere
private right.97 In this connection, it is interesting to compare a West Virginia statute which empowers the owner
0' The illustrative cases upon this point are cited below. See also United States v.
Snyder, 278 Fed. 650 (D. C. W. Va. 1922).
Is Williams v. State, 100 Ga. 511, 28 S. E. 624 (1897); People v. Kempner, 208
N. Y. 16, 101 N. E. 794 (1913) ; State v. Schmuch. 77 Oh. St. 438, 83 N. E. 797 (1908)
Colin v. State, 120 Tenn. 61, 109 S. W. 1149 (1908).
. BROOM & HADLEY, COmlIENTAIiIES (Waite's Ed., 1875), vol. 11, p. 549; Police
Com'rs v. Wagner, 93 Bid. 182, 48 Atl. 455 (1901).
01 Lippman v. People, 175 Ill. 101, 51 N. E. 873 (1898). Se also State v. Schmuck,
supra, n. 95.
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of bottle trade-marks to obtain a warrant for the search for
and seizure of bottles retained by another in violation
of the trade-mark rights. 8 On its face, this statute seems
designed merely to aid in the protection of a private right,
and so would be unconstitutional. It should be noted, however, that the same chapter of the Code makes the infringement of such trade-marks a misdemeanor,"0 and it can be
said that the purpose of the search and seizure authorized
is the proper enforcement of this penal provision. Under
such a construction, it would fall into the same category as
search for stolen goods. The question apparently has not
been raised.
The validity of search warrants, and of statutes authorizing them, depends further upon the nature of the property
to be seized. Search and seizure has come to have some of
the aspects of a proceeding in rem. It acts on the property
itself. It follows that before the property can be subjected
to the seizure, it must be property which itself has offended.
Some cases have carried this doctrine too far, and have said
that if property is contraband it is subject to seizure and
its taking will necessarily be reasonable. 10 0 This misconception is based upon a quotation from the judgment in
Boyd v. United States, which reads as follows:
"The search for and seizure of stolen or forfeited
goods, or goods liable to duties and concealed to avoid
payment thereof, are totally different things from a search
for and seizure of a man's private books and papers for
the purpose of obtaining information therein contained,
or of using them as evidence against him. The two things
differ toto coelo. In the one case, the government is entitled 0to the possession of the property; in the other it is
not."' '
The fact that the government is entitled to the possession
of property only means that it may proceed in an orderly
manner to acquire that possession. So the -emarks
quoted
above must be taken to refer rather to the sorts of property
which may be seized under a search warrant as distinguished from those which cannot be thus taken. In addi9'W.
" W.

VA. CODE, C. 62E, §22.

VA. CODE, c. 62E, §21.
United States v. O'Dowd, 273 Fed. 600 (D. C. Ohio, 1921); United States v.
Fenton, 268 Fed. 221 (D. C. Mont., 1920).
101 Bradley, J. in Boyd v. United States. supra, n. 2.
10
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tion to the kinds of property referred to, the right of search
10 2
and seizure was early extended to gambling devices.
Here the property is clearly contraband. Another field
into which the search warrant has been put is that of the
10 3
abatement of nuisances by seizing the offending property.
When the possession of intoxicating liquor first came to be
regarded as unlawful in certain instances, it was for a time
doubted whether the beverage itself was a proper subject
of search and seizure. 10 4 As the prohibition laws developed,
however, and liquor became contraband, it became well
settled that it could properly be taken under a search warrant. 0 5
It is sometimes indicated that books and papers are
never a proper subject of search and seizure. 10 6 That assumption is too broad. Books and papers which are valuable to the government only as evidence cannot be taken
under a search warrant,'0 7 just as any other property of a
purely evidentiary nature cannot be taken. 018 It is not its
character as a book or paper which saves it, but it is the
fact that it is not contraband property. In cases where the
papers themselves may offend, they are as much subject to
search and seizure as is any other property. The true
principle as to what property may be taken has been stated
recently by the Supreme Court:
"They (search warrants) may not be used as a means
of gaining access to a man's house or office and papers
solely for the purpose of making search to secure evidence to be used against him in a criminal or penal proceeding, but * * * they may be resorted to only when a
primary right to such search and seizure may be found
in the interest which the public or the complainant may
have in the property to be seized, or in the right to the
possession of it, or when a valid exercise of the police
power renders possession of the property by the accused
unlawful and provides that it may be taken. There is no
',' Commonwealth

v. Dana. 2 Metcalf (Mass.)

329 (1841).

3' Cold Storage Co. v. Chidago, 211 U. S. 306 (1908) ; Orlando v. Pragg, 31 Fla.

111, 12 So. 368 (1893) ; Nelson v. Minneapolis, 112 Minn. 16, 127 N. W. 445 (1910);
State v. Marshall, 100 Miss. 626, 56 So. '792 (1911) ; St. Louis v. Liessing, 190 Mo. 464,

89 S. W. 611 (1905).
104 State

v. Stoffels,

89 Minn. 205, 94 N.

W.

675 (1903) ; Lincoln v. Smith, 27

Vt.

340 (1855).
;11 Cases collected in note, 27 A. L. R. 709.
203Boyd v. United States, supra. n. 2.
4"T United States v. Kirschenblatt, 16 F. (2d) 202 (C. C. A. 2d, 1926) ; People v.
Defore, supra, n. 44.

US Newberry v. Carpenter, 107 Mich. 567, 65 N. W. 530 (1895).
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special sanctity in papers, as distinguished from other
forms of property, to render them immune from search
and seizure, if only they fall within the scope of the
principles of the cases in which other property may be
seized."',0 9
One writer has suggested that the latter case goes too far:
-that there should be power by statute to extend search and
seizure beyond property which itself offends to that which
is merely evidentiary. n 0 Such an extension would conflict
with the historical basis of search and seizure. Notwithstanding that fact, it might be considered reasonable if the
proper administration of justice demanded it. In view of
the language used in the Gouled Case, however, such necessity would have to be presented rather strongly before such
statutory extension could be recognized as valid.
The third general requisite of a valid search warrant is
that it must conform to the statutory provisions relating to
its issuance. A search warrant is generally considered as
a creature of statute, with the one common-law exception:
the search for stolen goods.'
The various Constitutions
and statutes give rather detailed directions as to its issuance, and these provisions limit strictly its scope. Even
though the statutes might constitutionally go further, if
they do not, the warrant must conform to them. n 2 It is
therefore probably worth while to make a brief summary
of the statutes of the United States and of West Virginia
relating to search warrants, and the construction put upon
them by the Courts.
A search warrant is defined as "an order in writing, in
the name of the people, signed by a magistrate, directed to
a peace officer, commanding him to search for personal
property and bring it before the magistrate." 113 In Engug Gouled v. United States, 255 U. S. 298 (1921). The idea that the papers themselves may offend is further illustrated in Schenk v. United States, 249 U. S. 41 (1919);
Commonwealth v. Dana, supra, n. 102.
210 31 YAtZ L. J. 522.
lu In ro Swan, 150 U. S. 637 (1893) ; United States v. Vallos, 17 F. (2d) a0
(D. C. Wyo., 1926) ; HALsaURY's LAWS OF ENGLAND, VOl. IX, p. 810.
211 The effect of this rule has recently been forcibly illustrated in West Virginia.
In 1919 the legislature enacted c. 32A, §37 of the Code, which provided that §9 of the
same chapter should apply to the offense of Possessing intoxicating liquor. §9 author.
ized the issuance of search warrants. In 1923, the legislature undertook to amend and
re-enact §37, and in doing so omitted to make §9 apply. (Acrs, 1923, c. 29, §37.) The
result was that there was no authority to issue search warrants for liquor merely
possessed contrary to law. At least one circuit judge has been required to set aside
convictions on this ground. The present session of the legislature has before it measures
to remedy this defect. (House Bill No. 318, Senate Bill No. 195).
n3 People v. Kempner, supra, n. 95.
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land, they are issued by justices of the peace. 114 Under
federal statutes, they may be issued by the judge of a federal District Court, by the judge of a state or territorial
court of record, or by a United States commissioner for the
district wherein the search is to occur.115 In West Virginia,
the power to issue them is in general lodged in justices of
the peace,"0 and for the search for intoxicating liquors, it
is extended to the judges of circuit and intermediate
courts. 1 7 The power to issue search warrants is limited
strictly to those designated by statute, and cannot be delegated.118
The warrant may be directed, in federal practice, to any
civil officer of the United States duly authorized to enforce
or assist in enforcing any law thereof, or to a person so
duly authorized by the President.119 It was for a time
doubted whether a prohibition agent appointed by the
Internal Revenue department was a civil officer within the
meaning of this statute,1 20 but it is now generally held that

he is.121 Warrants under West Virginia law must be directed
to the sheriff or a constable of the county in which the
22
search is to be made.
The federal statutes allow the issuance of warrants for
the search for stolen or embezzled goods, property used as
a means of committing a felony, or property or papers used
in violation of the espionage laws. 23 They may issue under
West Virginia law to search for the following classes of
property: stolen or embezzled goods, 124 counterfeit money,
counterfeiting tools, etc., obscene books and pictures, lottery
tickets, gaming devices,' 25 fish and game taken contrary to
law,'12 0 gaming tables, faro banks, etc., 127 intoxicating
liquors,' 28 moonshine stills,129 and milk bottles used in vio"t

HALSBURY'S LAWS OF ENGLAND, vol. IX, p. 310.
Espionage Act, Tit. XI, §1, 40 STAT. AT LARGE 228.

"7

W. VA. CODE, c. 155, §§1 and 2.

"5

Steele v. United States , 267 U. S. 505 (1925).

"'

W.7 VA. CODE, c. 32A, §9. By House Bill No. 318 and Senate Bill No. 195, now
WV
pending in the legislature, this power would be extended to mayors of municipalities.
us Nevin v. Blair, 17 F. (2d) 151 (D. C. Pa. 1927).
Io Tit. XI, §6. 40 STAT. AT LARGE 229.
:' United States v. Musgrave, 293 Fed. 203 (D. C. Neb. 1925).
"2 W. VA. CODE, c. 155, §3.
a Tit. XI, §2, 40 STAT. AT LARGE 228.
"'
W. VA. CODE, C. 155, §1.
" Idem, c. 155, §2.
115 Idem, c. 62, §2b.
"T7

Idea, c. 151, §1.
c. 32A, §9.

2*8 Idem,

229Idem, c. 32A, §37.
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lation of trade mark rights. 130
The mode of issuance, under federal law, is as follows:
The judge or commissioner must, before issuing the warrant, examine on oath the complainant and any witness he
may produce, and require their affidavits or take their depositions in writing and cause them to be subscribed by the
parties making them. The affidavits or depositions must
set forth the facts tending to establish the grounds of the
application or probable cause for believing that they exist.
If the judge or commissioner is thereupon satisfied of the
existence of the grounds of the application or that there is
probable cause to believe their existence, he must issue a
search warrant signed by him with his name pf office, stating
the particular grounds or probable cause for its issuance
and the names of the persons whose affidavits have been
taken in support thereof. 131 The statutes of West Virginia
do not make such detailed provisions for the issuance of
warrants. In general, the justice may issue them "if satisfied that there is reasonable cause for such relief."' 132 A
warrant to search for intoxicating liquors may issue merely
an oath that some person is violating the prohibition laws,
or that affiant has cause to believe and does believe that
liquors are being kept in any place. 13 3 It will be observed
that the latter statute does not require that the magistrate
examine into the facts, or that the complainant state them.
For that reason it has been urged that the statute is unconstitutional. 34 The contention was that the issuance of a
search warrant is a judicial act and that the magistrate
cannot be relieved of the duty of ascertaining whether
there is in fact probable cause for its issuance. The Court
held, however, that the statute is not unconstitutional. Its
judgment was based upon the proposition that its requirements were fully as rigid as those of the common law. An
examination of the principal authority upon which the
Court relied shows that this is not the case. Hale lays down
the rule as follows:
"They are not to be granted without oath made before
the justice of a felony committed, and that the party
Idem, c.
M. Tit. XI,
1 W. VA.
Im Idem, c.
230

62E, §22.
§6, 40 STAT. AT LARGE 229.
CoDE, c. 155, §1.
32A, §9.

134 State v. Kees, 92 W. Va. 277, 114 S. E. 617, 27 A. L. R. 681 (1922).
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complaining hath probable cause to suspect they are in
such a house or place, and doth shew his reasons of such
suspicions, * * * * * for these warrants are judicial acts,
and must be granted upon the examination of the fact."'' 13
The most of the authorities have taken the position that
while the legislature may define the standard of probable
cause, it may not reduce that standard below its level as
it was at the common law, and have accordingly held that
such a statute as that under consideration is unconstitutional. 13 The West Virginia court recognized this proposition, but felt that the standard had not been reduced.
Even though the decision be unsound on that point, it may
yet be justified. The fact that in 1789 it was unreasonable
to issue a search warrant on the mere oath of a -complainant that he had probable cause to believe certain facts does
not necessarily mean that it is unreasonable today. A
standard so flexible cannot be bound forever by old conceptions of reasonableness. It might well be argued that such
an oath as required in our statute is quite sufficient, not because it was sufficient when the Constitution was adopted,
but because it is reasonable today. Apparently no court
has taken this position however.
The statutes add nothing to the constitutional requirements as to the description of the place to be searched and
the property to be seized. They merely provide that the
officer must be commanded to search in a named place for
specified goods. 137 Under these and similar provisions the
decisions have varied considerablg as to the degree of certainty of description required. As to the place to be
searched, some courts require that it be described with the
same exactness used in a conveyance of land. 138 Such a
prohibitive requirement subverts the purpose of obtaining
a description. The evil sought to be avoided was that of a
roving search. An description which limits the officer to
an ascertained place ought therefore to be sufficient. The
in State v. Horner, 92 W. Va. 285, 114 S. E. 620 (1922).
'
HALE, P. C., vol. I, P. 150 Sea also HENING'S JUSTICE, p. 621; Espinasse, Nisi
Prius, vol. I, p. 381.
,;, Ex parte Burford, 3 Cranch 447 (1808); Byars v. United States, U. S. Adv.
Ops. Jan. 15, 1927; State v. Peterson, 27 Wyo. 185, 194 Pac. 342 (1920) ; 6 MINN. L. REV.
602. Contra, Koch v. District Court, 150 Ia. 151, 129 N. W. 740 (1911); Dupree v.
State, 102 Tex. 455, 119 S. W. 301 (1909).
W Tit. XI, §6, 40 STAT. AT LARGE 229; W. VA. CODE, C. 155, §3.
1c State v. Brann, 109 Me. 559, 84 At. 266 (1912).
Other cases collected in 17 Ann.
Cas. 232 and 101 Am. St. Rep. 331.
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better view accordingly is that,
"A description of a place to be searched is sufficient if

the officer with the warrant can, with reasonable effort,
ascertain and identify the place intended."'18 9

The West Virginia court is one which follows the more liberal tendency. 140

The description of the property to be

seized must vary in certainty with the occasion.

If the

purpose is to recover specific property, the description

ought to be sufficiently definite to preclude the possibility
of taking any other; but if the purpose is to take all prop-

erty of a certain character, a description of that character
is sufficient. 14 1

So in a search for stolen goods more par-

ticularity is required than in a search for intoxicatint
liquor. 142 Here again some courts have imposed stringent
requirements as to definiteness, 43 but the tendency is
toward requiring only such a description as will keep the
144
scope of the search within reasonable bounds.
Under the statutes of the United States, a search warrant

may be executed only by the officer to whom directed and

such persons as he may call to render aid.1 45

The officer

may break his way into the place to be searched if after

notice of his authority and purpose he is refused admittance.1 4 The time of execution must be limited by the
warrant to the daytime, unless the affidavits are positive
that the property is in the place to be searched. 147 A war-

rant becomes void if not executed within ten days from its
issuance. 148

When the officer takes property, he must give

a copy of the warrant, together with a detailed inventory
of the property to the person from whom it is taken.149

A

-' Steele v. U. S., aupra, n. 121. More than one place may be described In a single
Warrant, Gray v. Davis, 27 Conn. 447 (1858) ; Contra. State v. Duane, 100 Me. 447, 62
Atl. 80 (1905).
The description in the warrant cannot be aided by that in the complaint, State v.
District Court, 70 Mont. 191, 224 Pac. 862 (1924), unless incorporated therein by reference, Commonwealth v. Certain Liquors, 122 Mass. 86 (1877).
10 State v. Brown, 91 W. Va. 709, 114 S. E. 372 (1922) ; State v. Montgomery. 94
N. Va. 153, 117 S. E. 870 (1923) ; State v. Noble, 96 W. Va. 482, 123 S. E. 237 (1024) :
State v. McKeen, 100 W. Va. 476. 180 S. E. 806 (1926) ; State v. Whitecotten, 101
W. Va. 492, 133 S. E. 106 (1926) ; State v. Jankowski, 184 S. E. 919 (1926) ; State W.
Johns, 186 S. E. 842 (1927). The description was held insufficient in State v. Emaweller,
78 W. Va. 214, 88 S. E. 787(1916).
-1 State v. Nejin, 140 La. 793, 74 So. 103 (1917).
Blrod v. Moss, 278 Fed. 123 (C. C. A. 4th, 1921).
E
"
Dupree v. State, supra, n. 136.
'" Steele v. U. S., supra, n. 121; United States v. Kaplan, 16 F. (2d) 802 (D. C.
,lass. 1926).
Tit. XI, §7, 40 STAT. AT LARGE 229.
Tit. XI, §§8, 9, 40 STAT. AT LARCE 229.
Tit. XI, §10, 40 STAT. AT LARGE 229.
Tit. X1, §11. 40 STAT. AT LARGE 229.
240 Tit. XI, §12, 40 STAT. AT LARGE 229.
1

"4
U
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copy of this inventory, under the oath of the officer, must
then be returned with the warrant to the magistrate who
issued it.10 The only provision in the West Virginia statutes
as to the mode of execution of search warrants is that they
may be executed either in the day or night.151
In general, property seized by a federal officer must be
taken before the magistrate who issued the warrant. If it
appears that it is the property described in the warrant, he
shall order it retained in the custody of the officer seizing
it, or to be otherwise disposed of according to law.15 2 The
West Virginia statutes provide that the property shall be
kept for use as evidence, and that the property be restored
to the rightful owner, if stolen goods, and burned if contraband.15 3 The prohibition statutes require that the liquor be
destroyed on conviction. 54 The latter statutes do not in
terms require that the goods be brought before a magistrate
to be further dealt with according to law. Such a requirement has been held indispensable to the constitutionality
of a statute.15 5 The practical effect of our statutes leads to
the same result, however, and so the question apparently
has not been raised.
These are the standards which the legislatures have set,
within which search warrants must be kept in order to
satisfy the constitutional requirement of reasonableness.
In so far as these legislative standards are not lower than
judicial standards of reasonableness, they define what is
a lawful search warrant. 15
There remains yet unsolved
the great question, when may an officer omit the formalities
ordained in the statutes, and proceed at once to the search
and seizure? As has been said, this action without process
is but a substitute for the more orderly method. - It is therefore axiomatic that a search and seizure without a warrant
must be of the sort which would be lawful if a warrant
were obtained; there can be no higher power without a
warrant than there could be with one.
(Continued in next issue)
'

Tit. XI, §13, 40 STAT. AT LARGE 229.

;51 W. VA. CODE, c. 155, §3.

Tit. XI. §16, 40 STAT. AT LARGE 229.
I" W. VA. CoDE, r- 155, §4.
'" dem, c. 32A. §11.
CooLmy, CONST'L LiMs. p. 430.
'a
State v. Kees, oupra, n. 134.

'*'
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